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Measurement problem

Why does a quantum measurement give one definite result when the theory describes a superposition of outcomes?

Summary

The wave function evolves smoothly into superpositions of possibilities, yet every measurement finds a single outcome; what counts as a measurement, and how definite results arise, has no agreed answer among the interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Why it is open

In 1995 the philosopher Tim Maudlin stated the problem as three claims that "are mutually inconsistent" [4]. The first is that the wave function is complete: it "specifies (directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system". The second is that it "always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation (e.g. the Schrödinger equation)". The third is that measurements "always (or at least usually) have determinate outcomes" [4]. A device built to show "UP" for an electron with spin up and "DOWN" for spin down, fed an electron in a superposition of the two, must under linear evolution end in a superposition of showing each; by symmetry, that state cannot describe a device showing exactly one [4].

Every proposed solution therefore gives up at least one claim: theories that add variables to the wave function give up the first, collapse theories the second, and many-worlds theories the third [4]. Wayne Myrvold sorts the approaches the same way, through John Bell's remark "Either the wavefunction, as given by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it is not right", and puts views that deny that the quantum state represents anything in reality, such as QBism and variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, in the first group [11]. Maudlin separates this "problem of outcomes" from a second problem: why outcomes occur with the probabilities given by Born's rule [4].

No body sets a bar for a resolution, and part of the disagreement is philosophical. Myrvold notes that all the main approaches are "consistent with observation", but that collapse theories depart from quantum probabilities in experiments not yet performed, which "permits, in principle, an empirical discrimination" [11]. Maudlin argues, as a philosophical claim, that each option "demands the postulation of new physics" [4].

What is known

Decoherence (1980s–2004). Air molecules and photons constantly entangle a macroscopic apparatus with its environment, so that interference between its pointer states quickly becomes unobservable; this is decoherence [11]. In a 2004 review, Maximilian Schlosshauer concluded that, within the standard interpretation, "decoherence cannot solve the problem of definite outcomes": the superposition persists in the larger system that includes the environment, and the process could in principle be reversed [5]. Decoherence does help with another part of the problem, explaining which pointer states are robust and why position is the usual definite property [5]. Maudlin makes the same point as a philosophical argument: even a state without interference terms "does not represent exactly one of the outcomes as occurring" [4]. Because system–environment entanglement is very hard to undo, decoherence has also been proposed as a source of irreversibility in nature [5]; see the Papex page Arrow of time.

Theorems about the quantum state (2012–2020). Matthew Pusey, Jonathan Barrett and Terry Rudolph proved that any model in which a quantum state represents "mere information" about an underlying physical state, and in which independently prepared systems have independent physical states, contradicts the predictions of quantum theory [6]. In extended Wigner's-friend scenarios, which treat observers themselves as quantum systems, Kok-Wei Bong and colleagues proved in 2020 that if quantum evolution can be controlled at the scale of an observer, one of "No-Superdeterminism", "Locality" or "Absoluteness of Observed Events" must be false, and violated the resulting inequalities in a proof-of-principle experiment in which "a photon's path is deemed an observer" [9]. Myrvold writes that such results "do not pose problems for existing approaches", since each approach gives up one of the assumptions [11].

Testing collapse (1986–2021). Giancarlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber (GRW) proposed in 1986 a modified dynamics that "forbids the occurrence of linear superpositions of states localized in far-away spatial regions" for macroscopic objects while agreeing with quantum theory for microscopic ones [3]. Its continuous form, continuous spontaneous localisation (CSL), has two free parameters, a collapse rate λ and a correlation length rC; GRW chose λ ≈ 10⁻¹⁶ s⁻¹ and Stephen Adler λ ≈ 10⁻⁸±² s⁻¹, both with rC ≈ 10⁻⁷ m [7]. Collapse makes particles diffuse randomly, so charged particles emit faint radiation that underground detectors can search for [10, 13]. Roger Penrose proposed that superpositions collapse through gravity (see the Papex page Quantum gravity), with a decay time close to one suggested earlier by Lajos Diósi: the Diósi–Penrose model [10]. In 2021 Sandro Donadi and colleagues, using a germanium detector at the Gran Sasso underground laboratory, set a lower bound of 0.54 × 10⁻¹⁰ m on the model's size parameter R0, an order of magnitude above Penrose's estimate of 0.05 × 10⁻¹⁰ m for that crystal, ruling out "the natural parameter-free version" of the model [10].

Recent results (2026). In March 2026 the XENON collaboration published in Physical Review Letters a search for this radiation in 1–140 keV data from the first science run of its XENONnT detector, also at Gran Sasso [13]. It set λ/rC² < 3.0 × 10⁻³ s⁻¹ m⁻² at 90% confidence, about 135 times below the previous best limit, from the Majorana Demonstrator, and R0 > 4.9 × 10⁻¹⁰ m [13]. For the white-noise version of CSL, GRW's parameter values lie 9.1σ from the best fit, and "values in the originally proposed parameter ranges are experimentally excluded for the first time"; the collaboration adds that "a wider parameter range remains to be probed for colored or dissipative model extensions" [13].

Main approaches

Additional variables: Bohmian mechanics. Particles have definite positions at all times, guided by the wave function, so that "pointers always point" [12]. Strongest evidence: David Bohm showed in 1952 that such a theory "leads to precisely the same results for all physical processes as does the usual interpretation" [1]. Main difficulty: agreement with the Born rule rests on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" whose justification is "a rather delicate matter", and the theory "is not Lorentz invariant" and cannot easily be made so [12]. Because it reproduces the quantum probabilities, no experiment so far separates it from standard quantum mechanics [11].

Collapse models (GRW, CSL, Diósi–Penrose). The wave function obeys a modified, random equation under which superpositions of macroscopically different states quickly decay [3, 7]. Strongest evidence: unlike the interpretations, the programme predicts departures from quantum mechanics, and experiments are now testing and in part excluding its parameters [7, 10, 13]. Main difficulty: the CSL parameters are free; their values "must follow from some underlying fundamental principles and/or be determined by experiments" [7], and the 2026 exclusion covers only white-noise CSL, leaving coloured and dissipative versions [13].

Many worlds (Everett). The wave function is complete and always evolves linearly; every outcome occurs, each in its own branch or world [11]. Strongest evidence: Hugh Everett presented it as a formulation "from which the conventional interpretation can be deduced" [2], and it leaves the mathematics of quantum theory unchanged [14]. Main difficulty: probability. Lev Vaidman calls the question "How can probability exist if all possible outcomes occur?" "arguably the most serious difficulty", and the derivation of the Born rule from decision theory by David Deutsch and David Wallace is the subject of "a flurry of mostly critical papers" [14]. Both points are philosophical arguments.

QBism and other epistemic views. For Christopher Fuchs, David Mermin and Rüdiger Schack, a quantum state is an agent's personal judgment, and collapse "is nothing but the updating of an agent's state assignment on the basis of her experience"; they argue that this removes the "pseudo-problems" of quantum foundations [8]. Strongest argument (philosophical): no new dynamics or variables are needed, and an anti-realist about quantum states can sidestep the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem by rejecting its framework [11]. Main difficulty: critics, following Christopher Timpson, argue that QBists cannot account for quantum theory's explanatory success; Richard Healey notes that the QBist reply "does not address" part of this objection [15].

Open sub-questions

  1. Coloured collapse noise. Which coloured or dissipative versions of CSL survive the 2026 XENONnT limits, and what spectrum of spontaneous radiation does each predict [13]?
  2. The Diósi–Penrose window. Experiments now require R0 > 4.9 × 10⁻¹⁰ m, while requiring superpositions of micrometre-sized objects to collapse within about 0.01 s gives an upper bound of about 10³ Å; which experiment could close the remaining range [13]?
  3. Larger observers. Can the inequalities of Bong et al. be violated when the "observer" is a larger quantum system than a photon's path, such as a register of qubits [9]?
  4. Quantum non-equilibrium. Is there a concrete observable signature of Bohmian systems out of quantum equilibrium, given that "we have at present no idea" what one would look like [12]?
  5. Collapse parameters from the environment. Can the free parameters of collapse models be derived from environmental interactions, as Schlosshauer suggests [5, 7]?
  6. Assumptions behind Everettian probability. Which of the three assumptions of the Deutsch–Wallace derivation (the symmetry of unitary quantum mechanics, consistent preferences over time, indifference to branching) do its critics reject, and can any be justified physically [14]?

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Key references

  1. Bohm, D. (1952). A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of "hidden" variables. I. Physical Review 85(2), 166–179. 10.1103/PhysRev.85.166 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  2. Everett, H. (1957). "Relative state" formulation of quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics 29(3), 454–462. 10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  3. Ghirardi, G. C., Rimini, A. & Weber, T. (1986). Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems. Physical Review D 34(2), 470–491. 10.1103/PhysRevD.34.470 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  4. Maudlin, T. (1995). Three measurement problems. Topoi 14(1), 7–15. 10.1007/BF00763473 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  5. Schlosshauer, M. (2004). Decoherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations of quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics 76(4), 1267–1305 (published online 2005). 10.1103/RevModPhys.76.1267 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  6. Pusey, M. F., Barrett, J. & Rudolph, T. (2012). On the reality of the quantum state. Nature Physics 8(6), 475–478. 10.1038/nphys2309 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  7. Bassi, A., Lochan, K., Satin, S., Singh, T. P. & Ulbricht, H. (2013). Models of wave-function collapse, underlying theories, and experimental tests. Reviews of Modern Physics 85(2), 471–527. 10.1103/RevModPhys.85.471 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  8. Fuchs, C. A., Mermin, N. D. & Schack, R. (2014). An introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum mechanics. American Journal of Physics 82(8), 749–754. 10.1119/1.4874855 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  9. Bong, K.-W., Utreras-Alarcón, A., Ghafari, F., Liang, Y.-C., Tischler, N., Cavalcanti, E. G., Pryde, G. J. & Wiseman, H. M. (2020). A strong no-go theorem on the Wigner's friend paradox. Nature Physics 16(12), 1199–1205. 10.1038/s41567-020-0990-x · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  10. Donadi, S., Piscicchia, K., Curceanu, C., Diósi, L., Laubenstein, M. & Bassi, A. (2021). Underground test of gravity-related wave function collapse. Nature Physics 17(1), 74–78 (published online 2020). 10.1038/s41567-020-1008-4 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  11. Myrvold, W. (2016, substantively revised 23 March 2022). Philosophical issues in quantum theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  12. Goldstein, S. (2001, substantively revised 20 September 2025). Bohmian mechanics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  13. Aprile, E., Aalbers, J., Abe, K. et al. (XENON Collaboration) (2026). Challenging spontaneous quantum collapse with the XENONnT dark matter detector. Physical Review Letters 136(12), 120201. 10.1103/2jm3-4976 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  14. Vaidman, L. (2002, substantively revised 17 June 2026). Many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  15. Healey, R. (2016, substantively revised 8 September 2026). Quantum-Bayesian and pragmatist views of quantum theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026

Page reviewed 15 Oct 2026

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Open, as listed by Wikipedia · Unsolved problems in physics. Checked 08 Oct 2026.

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