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Open problem · Neuroscience · Open

Hard problem of consciousness

Why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience?

Summary

Explaining what the brain does, such as discriminating, integrating and reporting, seems to leave open why any of it is accompanied by felt experience. Many philosophers and scientists regard this as a genuine problem without a solution; others argue that no such problem exists.

Why it is open

David Chalmers posed the problem in 1995 by separating "easy" from "hard" problems of consciousness [1]. The easy problems concern functions such as discrimination, attention and reporting, which can be studied through neural or computational mechanisms [1]. The hard problem is the problem of experience: as Thomas Nagel put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism [1]. Chalmers argued that explaining these functions may still leave their accompanying experience unexplained [1]. Using Joseph Levine's term, he called this an explanatory gap between functions and experience [1].

The problem is partly philosophical, and the first dispute is whether it exists: Anil Seth and Tim Bayne describe a critical question as whether it is a genuine challenge for a science of consciousness or something that "ought to be dissolved rather than solved" [8]. The disagreement concerns what would count as an explanation, as well as which mechanisms experiments identify [1, 8].

Experiments can find which processes accompany experience and test theories that name them [14]; that work has its own Papex page, the neural basis of consciousness. Chalmers argues that experimental tests cannot conclusively settle every aspect of experience [1], and that versions of scientific theories can accommodate different metaphysical positions [4].

What is known

The formulation (1995). Chalmers argued that reductive explanation, which accounts for a phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes, cannot close the gap, because, in his view, physical theory does not logically entail experience [1]. He considered feature binding and global workspace accounts explanations of functions, and proposed treating experience as fundamental, linked to physical processes by psychophysical laws [1].

Deflationary replies (2001–2016). Daniel Dennett argued that global accessibility is not the cause of consciousness; "rather, it is consciousness", which he likened to "fame in the brain" [2]. Keith Frankish, who counts Dennett as its leading defender, named the position illusionism: experiences do not have phenomenal properties, the felt qualities they seem to have, and the task is to explain why they seem to, which he called the illusion problem [3]. In 2016 he described illusionism as "a minority position" [3]. Physicalists who reject illusionism can instead accept an explanatory gap between phenomenal properties and their neural substrates, Frankish notes [3], and some trace the appearance of a hard problem to the special concepts we use for our own experiences, called phenomenal concepts [8].

The meta-problem (2018). Chalmers then posed the meta-problem: explaining why we think there is a hard problem, in terms that do not mention consciousness [4]. He treats it as an empirical problem for philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and computational modelling [4]. He also set a test for theories: if a realist theory names mechanism M as the basis of consciousness, M should help explain our judgements about consciousness [4].

Scientific theories (2020–2023). Seth and Bayne class integrated information theory (IIT) and some higher-order theories as addressing the hard problem directly; global workspace theories focus on the functions of consciousness, and some predictive processing theorists set aside the existence of experience [8]. IIT 4.0 starts from the existence of experience and proposes that "an experience is identical to the cause–effect structure unfolded from a maximal substrate" [13]. Global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory studies conscious access and questions the distinction, drawn by Ned Block, between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness [7].

What experiments can test (2019–2025). Adrien Doerig and colleagues argued from the theory of computation that theories tying consciousness to causal structure, such as IIT, for which feedforward systems are never conscious, are "either false or outside the realm of science" [5]. IIT's proponents accept that a feedforward system can be functionally equivalent to a recurrent one while, on their theory, lacking experience [13]. Johannes Kleiner replied that the argument needs the premise that brain activity cannot be used to test theories of consciousness, which he rejects [6]. In the Cogitate adversarial collaboration, proponents of IIT and GNW theory preregistered rival predictions, tested in 256 participants; the 2025 report found results that "align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging key tenets of both theories" [14]. The consortium tested the theories' biological implementations because their mathematical or computational cores are difficult to test directly, so theorists could respond to challenging data by changing an implementation while keeping the core [14].

Recent debates (2023–2026). A 2023 PsyArXiv letter by IIT-Concerned disputed whether experiments tested IIT’s core and challenged its scientific status [12]. Giulio Tononi and colleagues defended its testability in a March 2025 Nature Neuroscience comment [15]. In June 2026 Vikas O’Reilly-Shah, Alessandro Selvitella and Aaron Schurger argued in Neuroscience of Consciousness that rapid plasticity limits the unfolding argument’s equivalence with static feedforward networks; they do not establish that plasticity is necessary for consciousness, and explicitly retain the challenge to strong IIT [11]. Also in June 2026, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup and Elizabeth Ann Stoll proposed a probabilistic, holographic account of perceptual experience in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. They present testable predictions and claim an account of naturalisation, rather than an experimental demonstration resolving the hard problem [10].

Main approaches

Physicalism. Experience is a physical or functional process; the gap lies in our concepts or knowledge, not in the world [3, 8]. Strongest argument: it offers "a simple and unified vision of the world" without dualism's difficulty of understanding how mind and brain interact [9], and Seth and Bayne think the problem's grip "may loosen" as the capacity to explain, predict and control experience grows [8]. Main difficulty: Chalmers' argument that physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness, so that no physical account entails experience [1].

Illusionism. Phenomenal consciousness does not exist; only the appearance of it needs explaining [3]. Strongest argument: a debunking argument, which Chalmers counts among the best arguments for illusionism: if our beliefs about consciousness have a correct explanation that does not invoke consciousness, those beliefs are not justified [4]. Main difficulty: it seems to deny the data, the most basic objection by Frankish's own account [3]; Chalmers' reply is that people sometimes feel pain, so strong illusionism is false [4].

Global workspace. GNW links conscious access to information becoming globally available across cortical networks [7]. Dennett additionally identifies consciousness with global accessibility [2]. Strongest evidence: its proponents describe experimental support for late ignition and sustained long-distance activity [7]. Main difficulty: Chalmers counts access among the easy problems, so on his view explaining access leaves experience unexplained [1]; and Cogitate found no general ignition when stimuli disappeared [14].

Integrated information. Experience is identical to a structure of intrinsic cause–effect power [13]. Strongest evidence: it inspired the perturbational complexity index, which separates levels of consciousness [7], and it addresses experience directly rather than its functions [8, 13]. Main difficulty: its quantity Φ "cannot be easily computed from large-scale data" [7]; it implies that feedforward machines could behave like us without experience [13], which the unfolding argument turns into a testability problem [5]; Cogitate found no sustained synchronisation within posterior cortex [14]; and its scientific status is disputed [12, 15].

Panpsychism and Russellian monism. Panpsychism treats mentality as fundamental and ubiquitous; some Russellian accounts connect experience to the intrinsic nature of matter [9]. Strongest argument: it promises an account of the mind "within a unified conception of nature", between physicalism and dualism [9]. Main difficulty: the combination problem, above all how distinct micro-level subjects could combine into one conscious mind [9]. See also the problem of mental causation.

Open sub-questions

  1. Problem intuitions outside philosophy. How widespread are intuitions that functional explanations leave experience unexplained among non-philosophers, and how do these vary across languages [4]?
  2. Machines without the vocabulary. Can a computational model trained without human text about consciousness come to produce problem reports like ours, and which mechanism produces them [4]?
  3. The meta-problem test for theories. Does disrupting the activity that IIT or GNW theory names as the basis of consciousness change people's judgements about their own experience in the way each theory predicts [4, 7, 13]?
  4. Unfolding and plasticity. Which perturbation experiment could distinguish a rapidly plastic recurrent system from a fixed feedforward implementation on perception-relevant timescales [5, 6, 11]?
  5. Experience without access. Can a no-report design produce evidence of experience without global access, the method Mashour and colleagues say is missing [7]?
  6. Testing a core. Which experiment could test IIT's identity claim or the workspace's computational core directly, rather than their proposed locations in the brain [13, 14]?

Work on this in Papex

If you have a testable answer to one of the sub-questions above, you can draft it as a private hypothesis in Papex, or prepare the draft from Claude or ChatGPT with the Papex connector. You review the exact version, sign it and decide whether to publish it; a public record that names this problem is listed on this page. A Papex record shows who signed which version and when. It is not peer review and does not mean the hypothesis is correct.

Key references

  1. Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3), 200–219. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  2. Dennett, D. (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79(1–2), 221–237. 10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00130-X · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  3. Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(11–12), 11–39. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  4. Chalmers, D. J. (2018). The meta-problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(9–10), 6–61. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  5. Doerig, A., Schurger, A., Hess, K. & Herzog, M. H. (2019). The unfolding argument: why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 72, 49–59. 10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  6. Kleiner, J. (2020). Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument. Consciousness and Cognition 85, 102981. 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102981 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  7. Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P. & Dehaene, S. (2020). Conscious processing and the global neuronal workspace hypothesis. Neuron 105(5), 776–798. 10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  8. Seth, A. K. & Bayne, T. (2022). Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 23(7), 439–452. 10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  9. Goff, P., Seager, W. & Allen-Hermanson, S. (2022). Panpsychism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, substantive revision 13 May 2022. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  10. Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. & Stoll, E. A. (2026). Naturalizing perceptual experience: the explanatory power of probabilistic computation and the holographic solution. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 20, 1816314 (published 29 June 2026). 10.3389/fnhum.2026.1816314 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  11. O'Reilly-Shah, V. N., Selvitella, A. M. & Schurger, A. (2026). A caveat regarding the unfolding argument: implications of plasticity. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2026(1), niag027. 10.1093/nc/niag027 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  12. IIT-Concerned, Fleming, S. M., Frith, C. D., Goodale, M. A., Lau, H., LeDoux, J. E., Lee, A. L. F. et al. (2023). The integrated information theory of consciousness as pseudoscience. PsyArXiv preprint, posted 16 September 2023. 10.31234/osf.io/zsr78 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  13. Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W. et al. (2023). Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms. PLOS Computational Biology 19(10), e1011465. 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  14. Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante, O., Gorska-Klimowska, U., Henin, S., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A. et al. (2025). Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness. Nature 642(8066), 133–142 (published online 30 April 2025). 10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  15. Tononi, G., Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Boly, M., Cirelli, C., Comolatti, R. et al. (2025). Consciousness or pseudo-consciousness? A clash of two paradigms. Nature Neuroscience 28(4), 694–702 (Comment; published online 10 March 2025). 10.1038/s41593-025-01880-y · Checked 15 Oct 2026

Page reviewed 15 Oct 2026

Source

Open, as listed by Wikipedia · Unsolved problems in neuroscience. Checked 08 Oct 2026.

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