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Problem of mental causation

How can thoughts and intentions cause physical actions?

Summary

Everyday experience suggests that what we intend causes what we do, but squaring this with a brain whose activity appears to have sufficient physical causes has no agreed solution; the exclusion problem is its most discussed form.

Why it is open

Mental causation, the mind's influence on behaviour, is "central to our conception of ourselves as agents", David Robb, John Heil and Sophie Gibb write [11]. The problem was once how an immaterial soul could move a body; most philosophers now reject souls, and the question has become how mental properties could be causally relevant to behaviour [11]. They call it "problem or problems", because puzzles about the mind's efficacy arise in more than one way [11].

Its best-known form is a philosophical argument resting on two premises [11]. Completeness: "Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause" [11]. No Overdetermination: physical effects are not systematically overdetermined, that is, behaviour does not routinely have two separate sufficient causes [11]. If mental properties are not physical, they seem to have no causal work to do [11]. Completeness, they note, does not seem true by definition; it appears to be "a substantive, empirical claim about the causal structure of the universe" [11].

Experiments enter too [11]. Some psychologists argue that conscious intending is a product of non-conscious processes that do the causal work [11]. Robb and colleagues judge that attempts to assess the efficacy of mental states have met philosophical difficulties that "tend to overshadow the experimental evidence accumulated thus far" [11]. For felt qualities such as pain, the question meets the explanatory gap between brain events and experience, the hard problem of consciousness [12].

No body sets a bar for a resolution. The sources point to what is needed: an account of causation on which mental properties count as causes without breaking either premise, or a principled reason to give one up [11, 12]; and empirical answers to questions that Aaron Schurger and colleagues list as outstanding, such as which brain activity predicts an uncued movement and how the readiness potential relates to awareness of intention [10].

What is known

The exclusion argument (philosophical). Jaegwon Kim argued over many years that separating mental from physical properties excludes mental properties from a causal role [12]. Non-reductive physicalism holds that mental properties are not physical but are "realized" or constituted by physical ones; it grew from functionalism, on which a mental state is defined by its causal role and can be realised in physically different systems (multiple realisability) [11]. Whenever a mental property M is realised by a physical property P, P is relevant to producing behaviour, and M seems "causally idle, 'excluded' by the work of P" [11]. The argument generalises to any multiply realisable property, biological or geological ones included, which some philosophers take as a sign that it proves too much [11]. Even without leading to epiphenomenalism, Robb and colleagues write, it "presses on us a responsibility to explain how mental properties could play a causal role" [11].

Epiphenomenalism (philosophical). Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by brain events but have no effects on any physical events; Thomas Huxley, who held it, compared mental events in 1874 to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of a locomotive [12]. William Robinson calls the claim that it is incompatible with knowing our own minds, and so with knowing that epiphenomenalism is true, "the most powerful reason" for rejecting it; epiphenomenalists reply that knowledge of a mental event need not be caused by that event [12].

The timing of intention (1983–2011). Benjamin Libet and colleagues asked five subjects to move spontaneously and to report, from the position of a revolving spot, when they first felt the wish to move [1]. The readiness potential, a slow negative brain potential recorded at the scalp before self-initiated movement [10], began "by at least several hundred milliseconds" before that reported time, about 350 ms on average in series in which no preplanning was reported; they concluded that the cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act "can begin unconsciously" [1]. Chun Siong Soon and colleagues decoded the outcome of a free choice from prefrontal and parietal activity "up to 10 s before it enters awareness" [3]; the accuracy was above chance but "only marginally better than a random guess", Schurger and colleagues note [10]. Itzhak Fried, Roy Mukamel and Gabriel Kreiman recorded 1,019 neurons in 12 patients with epilepsy; 256 neurons of the supplementary motor area predicted the decision to move with more than 80% accuracy 700 ms before the reported time of awareness [5]. Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley argued that the experience of willing an act "arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act", and found that people can come to believe they caused an action they were in fact forced to perform [2].

Reinterpreting the readiness potential (2012–2025). Schurger, Jacobo Sitt and Stanislas Dehaene modelled the decision of when to move as a leaky stochastic accumulator: when the imperative to move is weak, spontaneous fluctuations largely decide when a threshold is crossed, and averaging trials aligned to movement makes them look like a gradual build-up [6]. On this view, as Schurger and colleagues argued in 2021, the onset of the readiness potential is not a real event in single trials, so comparing its timing with reported intention is "senseless" [10]. With a brain–computer interface, Matthias Schultze-Kraft and colleagues found that people could still cancel a movement after the readiness potential began, if the stop signal came earlier than 200 ms before movement onset, a "point of no return" [8]. Uri Maoz and colleagues analysed 18 participants who chose which of two non-profit organisations received a $1,000 donation: arbitrary choices showed the expected readiness potential, deliberate ones none, or one "at least substantially diminished" [9]. In 2025 Jake Gavenas, Schurger and Maoz probed 24 participants during self-paced movements and, "contrary to prior reports", found the early readiness potential unrelated to reported awareness of preparing to move [13].

Main approaches

Identity. Each mental property is identical to its physical realiser, so nothing is excluded [11]. Strongest argument: if M is P, there is no competition between them [11]. Main difficulty: multiple realisability; species-specific identities answer it but force us "to abandon the belief that pain is a single, natural kind", and a version using particular property instances seems to raise exclusion again [11].

Non-reductive autonomy or inheritance. Mental properties are causes in their own right, or inherit the powers of their realisers, for example as determinables of determinate physical properties, as Stephen Yablo proposed [11]. Strongest argument: such views secure a causal role for mental properties "without running afoul of Completeness" [11]. Main difficulty: autonomy views seem to give each effect two sufficient causes, and for inheritance views words such as "immanence" risk becoming mere labels unless the metaphysics is spelled out [11].

Difference-making and interventionism (philosophical). Causation is understood as difference-making [4] or in terms of interventions [7]. Strongest argument: on that account Christian List and Peter Menzies show that the exclusion principle is true or false contingently, and that one instance of it supports the causal autonomy of some higher-level properties [4]; James Woodward argues that exclusion arguments make "mistaken assumptions about what it is appropriate to control for or hold fixed" [7]. Main difficulty: in 2010 Michael Baumgartner argued that an interventionist-inspired defence cannot count mental properties as causes without departing from its own view of causation, and Woodward replied in 2015; epiphenomenalists may grant such a sense of causation while holding that all productive causation is physical [12].

Conscious will as illusion. Conscious intentions follow non-conscious processes that do the causal work [11]. Strongest evidence: the timing results and illusions of control [1, 2, 3, 12]. Main difficulty: many tasks use meaningless decisions, such as when to move a finger [12]; readiness potentials were absent or diminished before deliberate choices [9]; and the accumulator model, if right, "strips away the conceptual basis" for comparing the readiness potential with the timing of awareness [10].

Late decision. The decision to move is a threshold crossing close to movement, which reported intention tracks [10]. Strongest evidence: the model fits behaviour and EEG and correctly predicted a slow potential before responses to unpredictable interruptions [6], and corticospinal excitability rises abruptly only in the last 100 ms before muscle contraction [10]. Main difficulty: whether the readiness potential exists in single trials is unknown, and one study found its variance falling faster before self-initiated than cued movements, which the model fits only with an added assumption [10]; probe studies disagree on its link to awareness [13].

Open sub-questions

  1. Readiness without movement. In intracranial recordings, do readiness-potential-like excursions that end without movement occur during waiting periods at the rate a leaky accumulator predicts [6, 10]?
  2. Deliberate choices with invasive data. Do single neurons in the supplementary motor area show a premovement build-up before deliberate, consequential choices as they do before arbitrary ones [5, 9]?
  3. Reported intention and threshold. Trial by trial, does the reported time of intention track the threshold crossing estimated from a fitted accumulator [6, 10, 13]?
  4. Authorship with consequences. Does the false sense of authorship found by Wegner and Wheatley weaken when the action carries out a deliberate choice [2, 9]?
  5. Intervening on preferences. In a donation task like that of Maoz and colleagues, does changing a participant's stated preference between two organisations, with the motor response held the same, change the activity that precedes the choice [7, 9]?

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Key references

  1. Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W. & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): the unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106(3), 623–642. 10.1093/brain/106.3.623 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  2. Wegner, D. M. & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist 54(7), 480–492. 10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  3. Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J. & Haynes, J.-D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience 11(5), 543–545. 10.1038/nn.2112 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  4. List, C. & Menzies, P. (2009). Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle. The Journal of Philosophy 106(9), 475–502. 10.5840/jphil2009106936 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  5. Fried, I., Mukamel, R. & Kreiman, G. (2011). Internally generated preactivation of single neurons in human medial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron 69(3), 548–562. 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  6. Schurger, A., Sitt, J. D. & Dehaene, S. (2012). An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109(42), E2904–E2913. 10.1073/pnas.1210467109 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  7. Woodward, J. (2015). Interventionism and causal exclusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(2), 303–347 (published online 2014). 10.1111/phpr.12095 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  8. Schultze-Kraft, M., Birman, D., Rusconi, M., Allefeld, C., Görgen, K., Dähne, S., Blankertz, B. & Haynes, J.-D. (2016). The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(4), 1080–1085 (published online 2015). 10.1073/pnas.1513569112 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  9. Maoz, U., Yaffe, G., Koch, C. & Mudrik, L. (2019). Neural precursors of decisions that matter: an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice. eLife 8, e39787. 10.7554/eLife.39787 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  10. Schurger, A., Hu, P., Pak, J. & Roskies, A. L. (2021). What is the readiness potential? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25(7), 558–570. 10.1016/j.tics.2021.04.001 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  11. Robb, D., Heil, J. & Gibb, S. (2023). Mental causation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, substantive revision 2 February 2023. Source · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  12. Robinson, W. (2023). Epiphenomenalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, substantive revision 15 June 2023. Source · Checked 16 Oct 2026
  13. Gavenas, J., Schurger, A. & Maoz, U. (2025). Probing for intentions: the early readiness potential does not reflect awareness of motor preparation. Imaging Neuroscience 3, imag_a_00465 (published online 7 February 2025). 10.1162/imag_a_00465 · Checked 16 Oct 2026

Page reviewed 16 Oct 2026

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