Neural basis of self
What brain processes give rise to a person’s sense of self?
Summary
Why it is open
"Self" covers several phenomena [2, 9]. Shaun Gallagher distinguished a "minimal self", a self "devoid of temporal extension", from a "narrative self" that involves personal identity and continuity across time, and within the minimal self separated a sense of ownership from a sense of agency [2]. Olaf Blanke divides bodily self-consciousness into self-identification with a body (body ownership), self-location and the first-person perspective [9]. These aspects are studied with different methods: multisensory illusions and neurological patients for the bodily self [9], brain imaging of judgements about oneself for self-reference [6, 8], and heartbeat tasks and models of bodily feeling for interoception [10].
Whether any brain activity is specific to the self is disputed [6, 8]. Dorothée Legrand and Perrine Ruby found that the network engaged when people evaluate things in relation to themselves is also recruited at rest, when inferring others' minds, recalling memories and reasoning, and "demonstrates no preference for the self" [6]. A later meta-analysis by Pengmin Qin and Georg Northoff found one midline region specific to the self and others that were not [8].
Measurement is a further difficulty [12, 14, 15]. Much of the evidence on the bodily self comes from reports of illusory experiences, and Peter Lush and colleagues argue that such reports can be shaped by participants' expectations of what the experiment is testing [12, 15].
No body sets a bar for a resolution. Blanke proposed that the multisensory findings "may form the basis for a neurobiological model of bodily self-consciousness" [9], while Legrand and Ruby argue that standard self-evaluation tasks "do not target the self in its specificity" [6]. Blanke treats these aspects of the self as conscious experiences [9]; the wider search for the brain processes that accompany experience has its own Papex page, the neural basis of consciousness.
What is known
Body-ownership illusions (1998–2012). Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen reported an illusion "in which tactile sensations are referred to an alien limb", revealing "a three-way interaction between vision, touch and proprioception" [1]. In this rubber hand illusion, a rubber hand in view and the participant's hidden real hand are stroked with brushes; synchronous strokes make the rubber hand feel like one's own, and asynchronous strokes, the usual control, abolish or reduce the illusion [14]. In 2007 Bigna Lenggenhager and colleagues extended the method to the whole body in virtual reality: during visual–somatosensory conflict, participants felt that a virtual body seen in front of them was their own and mislocalised themselves towards it, "to a position outside their bodily borders" [5]. Blanke's 2012 review links self-identification, self-location and the first-person perspective to the processing of multisensory bodily signals in temporoparietal, premotor, posterior parietal and extrastriate cortices [9].
A case report (2002). Out-of-body experiences are usually brief sensations in which a person's consciousness seems to detach from the body and take up a remote viewing position [4]. In one patient undergoing evaluation for epilepsy treatment, focal electrical stimulation of the right angular gyrus induced them repeatedly, along with illusory changes of the arms and legs and whole-body displacements [4]. Blanke and colleagues proposed that such experiences "may reflect a failure by the brain to integrate complex somatosensory and vestibular information" [4]. This is evidence from a single person.
Self-reference and the default mode network (2009–2011). Legrand and Ruby located the self-evaluation network in the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporoparietal junction and temporal poles, and attributed its activity to inference and memory recall [6]. Qin and Northoff's meta-analysis of 87 studies with 1,433 participants found that the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex responded specifically to self-related stimuli, such as one's own name or face, compared with familiar ones, while the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices responded to both [8]. The self-specific activity overlapped with resting-state activity in the default mode network, and they suggest that the sense of self may arise from a "rest-stimulus interaction" in midline regions [8]. These imaging data are correlational.
Interoception (2011–2020). Interoception is "the sense of the internal physiological condition of the body" [10]. In a 2013 opinion article Anil Seth proposed that emotional feelings arise from "interoceptive inference", active prediction of the causes of signals from inside the body, which also shapes the experience of body ownership, with the anterior insular cortex as a key comparator; the detailed neuroanatomy, he wrote, "remains to be elucidated" [10]. Manos Tsakiris and colleagues measured heartbeat counting in 46 female volunteers and found that those with lower interoceptive sensitivity experienced a stronger rubber hand illusion [7]. In 60 undergraduates, Áron Horváth and colleagues found that heartbeat-tracking accuracy was not associated with the strength of the illusion, whereas the consistency of joint-position judgements was [13]. Both studies are correlational.
Depersonalisation (2001–2014). In depersonalisation disorder, people feel "a detachment from their own senses and surrounding events, as if they were outside observers" [3]. In an fMRI study of six patients, ten people with obsessive-compulsive disorder and six healthy volunteers, Mary Phillips and colleagues found that both control groups rated aversive pictures as more emotive than the patients did and activated the insula and occipito-temporal cortex more in response to them [3]. Matthias Michal and colleagues found that 24 patients detected their heartbeats as accurately as 26 healthy controls, with no correlation between "anomalous body experiences" and interoceptive accuracy [11]. These are small clinical samples.
Recent claims. In 2020 Lush and colleagues reported, in studies of 156, 404 and 353 participants, "substantial relationships" between hypnotisability and measures of mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion, and proposed that the control of experience to meet expectations "can account for experiential change in psychological experiments" [12]. In 2022 H. Henrik Ehrsson and colleagues, Tsakiris among them, reanalysed the 353-participant data and found no significant relationship when the synchronous condition was compared with the asynchronous control, and a significant illusion in all four quartiles of suggestibility [14]. Lush and Seth replied that the asynchronous condition "offers no protection against demand characteristic effects" and that the disagreement "is therefore not about data or analyses, but interpretation" [15].
Main approaches
Multisensory integration. The bodily self arises from integrating visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular signals about the body [1, 4, 9]. Strongest evidence: illusions that shift ownership and self-location in healthy people [1, 5], out-of-body experiences induced by stimulation in a patient [4], and an illusion present at every level of suggestibility [14]. Main difficulty: reports may partly reflect expectations that the usual asynchronous control does not remove, and Lush and Seth reply that expectancies, which do not vary with hypnotisability, could "readily account" for a null result they had themselves reported [12, 15].
Midline self-processing. Self-related judgements engage cortical midline regions whose activity is tied to the resting brain [8]. Strongest evidence: the self-specific response of the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex across 87 studies [8]. Main difficulty: the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices respond to familiar stimuli as well [8], and the wider network is also engaged by inferring others' minds, memory recall and reasoning [6].
The subjective perspective. Self-specificity lies in the subjective perspective, which relates any represented object to the subject and is anchored in the integration of motor commands with their sensory consequences [6]. Strongest argument: the self-evaluation network shows no preference for the self, so self-evaluation tasks miss what is specific to it [6]. Main difficulty: a later meta-analysis did find a self-specific midline response [8].
Interoceptive inference. The self is grounded in the brain's predictions about the body's internal state [10]. Strongest evidence: lower interoceptive sensitivity went with a stronger rubber hand illusion [7], and patients with depersonalisation showed weaker insula responses to aversive images [3], which Seth relates to imprecise interoceptive predictions [10]. Main difficulty: the link with heartbeat accuracy did not appear in a later sample [13], patients with depersonalisation detect their heartbeats normally [11], and the neuroanatomy is not yet worked out [10].
Open sub-questions
- Expectation-matched controls. Does the synchronous–asynchronous difference in rubber-hand ownership ratings remain when participants' expectancies for the two conditions are measured and matched [14, 15]?
- Heartbeats or proprioception. In a preregistered sample that measures both, does heartbeat-detection accuracy predict illusion strength once proprioceptive accuracy is accounted for [7, 13]?
- A self-specific midline response. Is the perigenual anterior cingulate response to one's own name or face still self-specific when familiarity and task are matched within the same participants [6, 8]?
- Insula and heartbeats together. In people with depersonalisation, do reduced insula responses to aversive images and normal heartbeat detection occur in the same individuals [3, 11]?
- Self-location and the angular gyrus. Does temporarily disrupting the right angular gyrus in healthy volunteers change self-location during a full-body illusion [4, 5, 9]?
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Key references
- Botvinick, M. & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature 391(6669), 756. 10.1038/35784 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(1), 14–21. 10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Phillips, M. L., Medford, N., Senior, C., Bullmore, E. T., Suckling, J., Brammer, M. J. et al. (2001). Depersonalization disorder: thinking without feeling. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 108(3), 145–160. 10.1016/S0925-4927(01)00119-6 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Blanke, O., Ortigue, S., Landis, T. & Seeck, M. (2002). Stimulating illusory own-body perceptions. Nature 419(6904), 269–270. 10.1038/419269a · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T. & Blanke, O. (2007). Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317(5841), 1096–1099. 10.1126/science.1143439 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Legrand, D. & Ruby, P. (2009). What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results. Psychological Review 116(1), 252–282. 10.1037/a0014172 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Tsakiris, M., Tajadura-Jiménez, A. & Costantini, M. (2011). Just a heartbeat away from one's body: interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of body-representations. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 278(1717), 2470–2476. 10.1098/rspb.2010.2547 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Qin, P. & Northoff, G. (2011). How is our self related to midline regions and the default-mode network? NeuroImage 57(3), 1221–1233. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.028 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 13(8), 556–571. 10.1038/nrn3292 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17(11), 565–573 (Opinion). 10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Michal, M., Reuchlein, B., Adler, J., Reiner, I., Beutel, M. E., Vögele, C. et al. (2014). Striking discrepancy of anomalous body experiences with normal interoceptive accuracy in depersonalization-derealization disorder. PLOS ONE 9(2), e89823. 10.1371/journal.pone.0089823 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Lush, P., Botan, V., Scott, R. B., Seth, A. K., Ward, J. & Dienes, Z. (2020). Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion. Nature Communications 11, 4853. 10.1038/s41467-020-18591-6 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Horváth, Á., Ferentzi, E., Bogdány, T., Szolcsányi, T., Witthöft, M. & Köteles, F. (2020). Proprioception but not cardiac interoception is related to the rubber hand illusion. Cortex 132, 361–373. 10.1016/j.cortex.2020.08.026 · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Ehrsson, H. H., Fotopoulou, A., Radziun, D., Longo, M. R. & Tsakiris, M. (2022). No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion. Nature Communications 13, 564 (Matters Arising). 10.1038/s41467-022-28177-z · Checked 16 Oct 2026
- Lush, P. & Seth, A. K. (2022). Reply to: No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion. Nature Communications 13, 563. 10.1038/s41467-022-28178-y · Checked 16 Oct 2026
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