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Animal consciousness

Which animals, or other living things, have conscious experience?

Summary

Animals cannot describe their experiences in words, so whether and which of them are conscious has to be inferred from behaviour and brain structure. There is no agreed way to test for subjective experience, and views range widely.

Why it is open

The question concerns phenomenal consciousness, the philosopher Ned Block's term for the qualitative aspects of experience, such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain [15]. Andrew Barron and Colin Klein call its most basic form subjective experience: there is "something it is like" for a conscious creature to be aware of the world [3]. Masking experiments on human consciousness are calibrated against what people report [12]; animals cannot report in words, which Jonathan Birch, Alexandra Schnell and Nicola Clayton note poses significant methodological challenges [8].

Birch wrote in 2020 that there is "no agreement on whether any invertebrates are conscious and no agreement on a methodology that could settle the issue" [12]. In 2024 Tim Bayne and colleagues described persisting uncertainty about how consciousness is distributed in nonhuman species and judged most proposed tests for consciousness to be "of limited use" [13]. Hakwan Lau notes that there are no agreed neural signatures of phenomenal consciousness, and that flexible behaviour, on which the 2024 declaration relies, can occur without it: people with blindsight report no experience in part of their visual field yet can guess what is shown there [15].

Consciousness may also differ between species. Birch, Schnell and Clayton propose five dimensions of variation, from perceptual richness to self-consciousness, so that each species has its own "consciousness profile" rather than a rank on one scale [8].

No body sets a bar for a resolution. The declarations below are statements signed by researchers, not tests [2, 14]. Two neighbouring questions have Papex pages: why any physical process is accompanied by experience, the hard problem of consciousness, and which brain processes underlie experience in humans, the neural basis of consciousness.

What is known

Fish and pain (2003–2016). Lynne Sneddon, Victoria Braithwaite and Michael Gentle found nociceptors, receptors for tissue-damaging stimuli, on the head of rainbow trout; trout given noxious substances in the lips beat their gill covers faster, took longer to resume feeding and behaved abnormally over a prolonged period, which the authors read as suggesting "discomfort" [1]. Taking the human brain region that feels pain as a benchmark, Brian Key argued in 2016 that fish "lack the necessary neurocytoarchitecture, microcircuitry, and structural connectivity" [5]. Sneddon and Matthew Leach replied that painkillers reduce the fish's prolonged responses, data accepted as evidence of pain in mammals, and that "the incompleteness of current knowledge certainly does not constitute evidence for inferring that fish in particular do not feel pain" [6].

Insects (2016). Barron and Klein argued that in vertebrates the midbrain supports subjective experience by creating "a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space", that structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions, and that the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian [3]. Shelley Adamo replied that some self-navigating robots meet the same definition, and that what is surprising is "not that bees can form neural simulations of their environment, but the labeling of this ability as consciousness" [4]. Cwyn Solvi, Luigi Baciadonna and Lars Chittka found that bumblebees given an unexpected sugar reward responded more positively to ambiguous cues and resumed foraging sooner after a simulated predator attack, effects abolished by a dopamine antagonist; they describe "positive emotion-like states" [7]. Birch notes a "vocal opposition" that regards insects as "natural zombies", cognitively sophisticated creatures with no conscious experiences [12].

Birds (2020). Andreas Nieder, Lysann Wagener and Paul Rinnert recorded single neurons in the pallium (forebrain) of crows performing a visual detection task [9]. An early component of the activity mainly reflected stimulus intensity; a later one predicted whether the crow reported seeing the stimulus, which the authors argue is "an empirical marker of avian consciousness" in a brain without a layered cerebral cortex [9].

Octopuses (2021). Robyn Crook found that octopuses (Octopus bocki) injected in one arm with dilute acetic acid avoided the chamber where they had been confined after the injection (8 animals; 7 saline controls showed no change), and preferred a chamber paired with pain relief by the local anaesthetic lidocaine [10]. She concluded that octopuses "are likely to experience the affective component of pain", while reporting that reversal by lidocaine was variable [10].

Plants (2021). Jon Mallatt and colleagues argued that claims of plant consciousness "lack sound scientific support": plants have not been shown to act proactively, and classical conditioning, even if confirmed in plants, does not require consciousness [11].

Declarations (2012 and 2024). On 7 July 2012 participants at the Francis Crick Memorial Conference in Cambridge signed a declaration, written by Philip Low, stating that "the absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states" and that "all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses" possess the neurological substrates of consciousness [2]. Birch, Schnell and Clayton later wrote that it "crystallised a scientific consensus" [8]; Lau notes that dozens of authors signed an open letter criticising it as premature [15].

Recent claims. The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness, launched at New York University on 19 April 2024, states that there is "strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birds" and "at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects)" [14]. Its signatories state that ignoring such a possibility in decisions affecting an animal is "irresponsible"; the page listed 612 signatures on 15 October 2026 [14]. In a November 2024 opinion article Lau called these claims a "broad overstatement": "none of the evidence cited in support of the declaration unequivocally points to phenomenal consciousness rather than the general capacity to behave flexibly" [15]. He wrote that some findings are suggestive but "far from definitive" [15].

Main approaches

Theory-heavy. Take a theory of human consciousness, such as the global workspace theory, and apply it to animals [12]. Strongest evidence: such theories rest on established human paradigms, such as backward masking, that compare conscious with unconscious perception of the same stimulus [12]. Main difficulty: those paradigms are calibrated against verbal reports, and Birch finds a trade-off between how relevant conditions drawn from humans are to animals and how strong the evidence is that they suffice for consciousness [12].

Markers by analogy (theory-neutral). List behavioural, functional and anatomical similarities to humans and infer consciousness by analogy, as many lists of pain markers do [12]. Strongest evidence: prolonged responses to noxious stimuli in fish [1] that painkillers reduce [6], and octopus responses that a local anaesthetic abolishes or reverses [10]. Main difficulty: Birch argues that such lists need a theory of minimum requirements to exclude nematodes, plants and bacteria [12]; Key reads the same fish evidence differently by requiring human-like brain structure [5]; and Lau argues that flexible behaviour can occur without experience [15].

Theory-light markers. Birch's facilitation hypothesis holds that conscious perception of a stimulus "facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus" [12]. His candidates are trace conditioning (learning to link two stimuli separated by a gap), rapid reversal learning and cross-modal learning [12]. Strongest evidence: in humans, trace eyeblink conditioning succeeds only when people are aware of the stimuli, a finding replicated by two further groups [12]. Main difficulty: which kinds of learning consciousness facilitates in humans is still debated, and some critics hold that all human associative learning requires awareness [12]. Birch judged in 2020 that a strong case for bee consciousness was "some way off" [12]. Mallatt and colleagues propose a related marker, operant learning about rewards and punishments [11].

Neural markers. Look for activity like that of conscious processing in humans, such as activity tracking report rather than stimulus [9], or for structures doing the work of the vertebrate midbrain [3]. Strongest evidence: the crow recordings [9]. Main difficulty: Birch expects neural correlates to vary a great deal across taxa, since invertebrates lack even the basic vertebrate brain plan [12], and Bayne and colleagues set out the challenges of developing such tests and strategies for validating them [13].

Open sub-questions

  1. Masking in bees. Does backward masking of a visual cue abolish cross-modal transfer or trace conditioning in bumblebees, as the facilitation hypothesis predicts if their perception has conscious and unconscious modes [12]?
  2. Report or experience in crows. Does the late, report-predicting component in crow pallial neurons persist when the bird must withhold or reverse its response, or does it track the motor report itself [9]?
  3. The forebrain and fish pain. Do the trout's prolonged responses to noxious stimuli [1] depend on the pallium, so that silencing it abolishes them, a test bearing on Key's structural argument and on Sneddon and Leach's reply [5, 6]?
  4. Octopus central processing. Is conditioned place avoidance after injury in octopus abolished when signals from the injured arm to the central brain are blocked, and why is reversal by lidocaine variable [10]?
  5. Bee states and learning. Does the dopamine-dependent positive state in bumblebees [7] also change performance in a task the facilitation hypothesis links to consciousness, such as rapid reversal learning [12]?
  6. Plants and operant learning. Can any plant learn from the consequences of its own actions, the marker Mallatt and colleagues propose for affective consciousness [11]?

Work on this in Papex

If you have a testable answer to one of the sub-questions above, you can draft it as a private hypothesis in Papex, or prepare the draft from Claude or ChatGPT with the Papex connector. You review the exact version, sign it and decide whether to publish it; a public record that names this problem is listed on this page. A Papex record shows who signed which version and when. It is not peer review and does not mean the hypothesis is correct.

Key references

  1. Sneddon, L. U., Braithwaite, V. A. & Gentle, M. J. (2003). Do fishes have nociceptors? Evidence for the evolution of a vertebrate sensory system. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 270(1520), 1115–1121. 10.1098/rspb.2003.2349 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  2. Low, P. (2012). The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. Francis Crick Memorial Conference, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 7 July 2012; written by Philip Low and edited by J. Panksepp, D. Reiss, D. Edelman, B. Van Swinderen, P. Low and C. Koch. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  3. Barron, A. B. & Klein, C. (2016). What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(18), 4900–4908. 10.1073/pnas.1520084113 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  4. Adamo, S. A. (2016). Consciousness explained or consciousness redefined? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(27), E3812 (letter on Barron & Klein 2016). 10.1073/pnas.1606942113 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  5. Key, B. (2016). Why fish do not feel pain. Animal Sentience 1(3), article 1. 10.51291/2377-7478.1011 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  6. Sneddon, L. U. & Leach, M. C. (2016). Anthropomorphic denial of fish pain. Animal Sentience 1(3) (commentary on Key 2016). 10.51291/2377-7478.1048 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  7. Solvi, C., Baciadonna, L. & Chittka, L. (2016). Unexpected rewards induce dopamine-dependent positive emotion–like state changes in bumblebees. Science 353(6307), 1529–1531. 10.1126/science.aaf4454 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  8. Birch, J., Schnell, A. K. & Clayton, N. S. (2020). Dimensions of animal consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24(10), 789–801. 10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.007 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  9. Nieder, A., Wagener, L. & Rinnert, P. (2020). A neural correlate of sensory consciousness in a corvid bird. Science 369(6511), 1626–1629. 10.1126/science.abb1447 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  10. Crook, R. J. (2021). Behavioral and neurophysiological evidence suggests affective pain experience in octopus. iScience 24(3), 102229. 10.1016/j.isci.2021.102229 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  11. Mallatt, J., Blatt, M. R., Draguhn, A., Robinson, D. G. & Taiz, L. (2021). Debunking a myth: plant consciousness. Protoplasma 258(3), 459–476 (published online 2020). 10.1007/s00709-020-01579-w · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  12. Birch, J. (2022). The search for invertebrate consciousness. Noûs 56(1), 133–153 (published online 2020). 10.1111/nous.12351 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  13. Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M. et al. (2024). Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 28(5), 454–466. 10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  14. Andrews, K., Birch, J., Sebo, J. et al. (2024). The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness. New York University, 19 April 2024. Source · Checked 15 Oct 2026
  15. Lau, H. (2024). Premature declarations on animal consciousness hinder progress. The Transmitter, 18 November 2024 (opinion article). 10.53053/BCOU1212 · Checked 15 Oct 2026

Page reviewed 15 Oct 2026

Source

Open, as listed by Wikipedia · Unsolved problems in neuroscience. Checked 08 Oct 2026.

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